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This paper challenges the popular view that devaluation of the rupee is inflationary.  
Recent developments in the theoretical literature are reviewed to explain why consumer 
prices would be unresponsive to exchange rate changes in the short run.  Then empirical 
tests are conducted for Pakistan during the period 1982 to 2001 to examine whether 
inflation is systematically related to changes in the exchange rate.  The empirical analysis 
finds no association between rupee devaluations and inflation in Pakistan.  It appears, 
therefore, that concerns about the inflationary consequences of rupee devaluation are 
unsupported by the facts.   
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Does devaluation lead to an increase in prices?  This is a critical question that 
policy-makers in Pakistan have faced continuously over the past three decades or so, 
and particularly since 1982, following the adoption of a flexible exchange rate 
policy.  At the beginning of 1972, the US dollar exchanged for about five Pakistani 
rupees.  After a devaluation in 1972 and a small revaluation in 1973, the exchange 
rate remained fixed at about ten rupees per dollar till the end of 1981.  The exchange 
rate was allowed to vary since January 1982 and it rose to a rate around sixty rupees 
per dollar over the next two decades.  This increase involved a number of sizable 
rupee devaluations.  Such devaluations receive considerable attention and often raise 
the concern that they would contribute to inflation.  The concern about inflation is 
based on the popular view, which has sometimes been shared by officials in policy-
making circles, that consumer prices are significantly affected by imported goods 
prices, which increase quickly in response to a devaluation.1  This view is generally 
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thought to find support in empirical studies of inflation in Pakistan.  In the most 
recent study on the subject, Ahmad and Ali (1999) assert that the “recent empirical 
work in Pakistan provides consistent evidence that the domestic price level responds 
significantly but gradually to exchange rate devaluation” (p. 237). 
Obviously, if the devaluation-inflation link exists, then devaluation comes 
with an important cost that necessarily must be factored into the exchange rate 
policy.  Furthermore, it implies that the authorities can only affect the real exchange 
rate temporarily, because as domestic prices rise, the initial effects of a nominal 
depreciation on the real exchange rate would be reversed.  On these two counts at 
least, exchange rate policy becomes fairly constrained. 
This paper argues that the fear of inflation associated with devaluations in 
Pakistan is largely unfounded.  We draw on recent developments in the literature on 
the exchange rate pass-through and the purchasing power parity to suggest reasons 
why consumer prices might  be unresponsive to changes in the exchange rate.  We 
also reexamine the evidence for Pakistan and present new results, which demonstrate 
that rupee devaluations have had little impact on inflation.2  The theory underlying 
the relationship between the exchange rate and consumer prices is reviewed in 
Section 2.  The empirical analysis is discussed in Section 3.  The conclusions of the 
paper are contained in Section 4. 
 
2.   THE EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH 
TO CONSUMER PRICES 
This section briefly discusses the channels through which changes in the 
exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices.  We begin with the conventional 
model that implies a significant and, under certain conditions, a complete pass-
through to consumer prices in the short run.3  We then discuss certain departures 
from the conventional model suggested by recent literature, which could account for 
little or no pass-through in the short run.  Finally, we examine the long-run 
relationship between the exchange rate and the price level, and discuss conditions 
that would weaken this relationship. 
 
2.1  Traded and Non-traded Goods 
The basket of goods entering the consumer price index (CPI) can be divided 
into traded and non-traded goods.  Letting Pt denote the CPI in period t, we can 
express it as 
θ−θ= 1)()( NTtTtt PPP , … … … … … (1)  
 
2Our results complement those of Siddiqui and Akhtar (1999), which show no causal relation 
between changes in the exchange rate and consumer-price inflation in Pakistan. 
3The degree of pass-through to a particular price index is defined as the elasticity of the price 
index with respect to the exchange rate.  The pass-through is complete when this elasticity equals one.   
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where TtP  and  
NT
tP  are the price indexes for traded and non-traded goods, and θ is 
the weight assigned to traded goods.  The home price of traded goods can be directly 
linked to the price of foreign traded goods adjusted for the exchange rate.  The 
conventional model assumes that traded goods are produced under competitive 
conditions.  This assumption implies that, in the absence of trade barriers, the price 
of a traded good expressed in a particular currency will be the same in each country.4 
The following relation can then be derived by aggregating over prices of individual 
traded goods: 
*T
tt
T
t PSP = , … … … … … … (2) 
where St is the exchange rate (expressed as the price of foreign currency) and *TtP  is 
the foreign price index for traded goods (which is assumed to use the same weights as 
the home index).  This relation implies that a change in the exchange rate will fully 
pass-through to the traded goods price index.  The relation can be easily modified to 
introduce trade costs (e.g., transportation costs, tariffs, and non-tariff barriers).  These 
costs introduce a wedge between the home and (exchange-rate adjusted) foreign prices, 
but as long as these costs are determined independently of the exchange rate, the 
exchange rate pass-through to traded goods prices would continue to be complete. 
The price for the non-traded goods sector will be determined by the demand 
and supply functions for this sector.  These functions would depend on the ratio of 
non-traded goods to traded goods prices.  Let γ be the price ratio that clears the non-
traded goods market.  Thus, in equilibrium 
.Tt
NT
t PP γ=  … … … … … … (3) 
Relation (3) provides an indirect link between the exchange rate and the non-traded 
goods price index.  If the price of non-traded goods is flexible and adjusts quickly, 
(3) will hold in the short run.  In this case, there will be a complete pass-through in 
the short run to both traded and non-traded goods prices [via (2) and (3)] and hence 
to the CPI.  In fact, assuming that relations analogous to (1) and (3) hold for the 
foreign economy, we can also link the domestic CPI to both the exchange rate and 
the foreign CPI.  Using (1), (3), their foreign counterparts, and (2), we can obtain 
,)/( 1** θ−γγ= ttt PSP  … … … … … (4) 
where *tP  and 
*γ  represent the CPI and the equilibrium relative price of non-traded 
goods in the foreign country.  The home CPI responds fully to the foreign CPI as 
well as the exchange rate in this relation. 
 
4Arbitrage would eliminate inter-country price differences under these conditions.  This result is 
referred to as the “Law of One Price”. 
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The short-run impact of the exchange rate on CPI would be weakened if non-
traded goods prices are sticky.  Exchange rate changes would now affect only traded 
goods prices in the short run and the short-run pass-through to CPI would equal the share 
of traded goods, θ.5  The share of traded goods can be substantial and thus the short-run 
pass-through to CPI can be sizeable even if non-traded goods prices adjust slowly. 
 
2.2   The Short-run Pass-through 
We next discuss a number of variations of the above model that could cause 
the short-run pass-through to be small.  Consider, first, the variations that loosen the 
traded goods price relation (2) in the short run.  One important point of departure in 
the recent literature has been to relax the assumption of perfect competition.  Under 
imperfect competition, prices include a markup over costs and producers have the 
discretion to vary the markup across countries (i.e., they can price to market).6  The 
pass-through to traded goods price would be incomplete if variations in the markup 
offset changes in the exchange rate.7  However, the equilibrium markup need not 
respond systematically to exchange rate changes.  In fact, it can be shown that the 
equilibrium markup would be invariant with respect to the exchange rate under the 
standard assumption of a constant price elasticity of demand. 
Another argument is that imperfectly-competitive producers would change 
prices infrequently in the presence of even small menu costs.  Infrequent price 
adjustment would not prevent complete pass-through in the importing country if the 
producer (exporter) fixes the price in its own currency.  However, if the price is set 
in local (importer’s) currency and is sticky, it would be unresponsive to exchange 
rate fluctuations in the short run.8  Local currency pricing can thus play an important 
role in blocking the impact of  exchange rate changes on traded goods prices in the 
short run.  However, while local currency pricing has been observed in some large 
industrial countries, such as the United States, it is not clear whether this practice 
occurs in developing countries like Pakistan. 
A weak response of the traded goods component of the CPI may also be 
explained by the fact that imported goods are generally not sold directly to 
 
5A 1 percent change in the exchange rate will cause a 1 percent change in the traded goods price 
index according to (2) and thus a θ percent change in CPI by (1). 
6See, for example, Krugman (1987) for a discussion of pricing to market.  It is assumed that trade 
costs and other factors segment international markets and make it difficult to arbitrage inter-country price 
differences.   
7The price of a traded good i supplied by a foreign producer would equal ∗µ= ittitTit CSP , where 
itµ  represent the markup and ∗itC  is the foreign marginal cost.  The pass-through would be incomplete if 
itµ  is inversely related to tS . 
8See Devereux and Engel (2001) for a discussion of local currency pricing and its implications for 
monetary policy. 
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consumers.  Many imported goods are, in fact, intermediate inputs imported by firms 
producing final products.9  If prices of the final products are adjusted infrequently, 
changes in the cost of inputs resulting from fluctuations in the exchange rate will not 
be quickly passed on to consumers.  Even non-intermediate imports go through 
distribution channels (transportation, marketing, retailing) before they are delivered 
to consumers.  These channels largely use non-traded services, which can account 
for a large fraction of the consumer price.10 The price component represented by 
local services would then not be affected by the exchange rate in the short run. 
The short-run pass-through could also be weakened by certain factors that 
introduce biases in measured prices and are of special relevance to developing 
economies.  For example, a home-currency devaluation could induce a substitution 
of cheaper lower-quality local goods for imported goods.  Burstein, Eichenbaum, and 
Rebelo (2001) refer to this phenomenon as “flight from quality” and argue that it 
helps explain why a number of large devaluations had a small impact on the 
measured inflation rate.  Price regulation of “essential” commodities and foreign 
exchange controls could represent another important source of bias in the observed 
price and exchange rate data.  Because measured values would not fully reflect true 
market values under these policies, the pass-through relation would be distorted.   
 
2.3  The Long-run Relation 
The reasons discussed above can insulate traded goods prices from changes in 
the exchange rate in the short run.  However, they do not explain why traded and 
non-traded goods prices would not fully respond to exchange rate changes in the 
long run. To understand the long-term association between these variables, it is 
important to note that both the exchange rate and consumer prices are determined 
endogenously and respond differently to various shocks.  Estimates of the effect of 
the exchange rate on consumer prices essentially capture the average response of the 
two variables to a variety of shocks.  To explain the long-run relation between the 
exchange rate and consumer prices, it is useful to discuss how these variables would 
respond to different shocks.  We can distinguish three types of shocks. 
First, there are temporary shocks to the foreign exchange and financial 
markets. These arise largely from policy interventions and private speculation 
triggered by changing expectations of future values.  These shocks account for much 
of the short-term variability of the exchange rate, but may have little effect on 
consumer prices for reasons discussed above. 
Second, there are permanent shocks to the money stock.  These shocks would 
be fully passed on to both the exchange rate and consumer prices in the long run.  
 
9A number of recent open economy macro-economic models [e.g., McCallum and Nelson 
(1999)], in fact, treat all imports as intermediate inputs. 
10See Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2001) for a discussion of the importance of the distribution 
costs. 
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Suppose, for example, that home money supply increases permanently by 10 percent.  
Assuming that the long-run money demand is unchanged, monetary equilibrium 
would require that the CPI rise by 10 percent in the long run.  As this change would 
not affect the equilibrium relative price of non-traded goods (γ), relation (4) implies 
that the exchange rate would also rise by 10 percent.  Thus a permanent monetary 
shock would bring about a change in the price level that would match the exchange 
rate change in the long run. 
Finally, there are real shocks (to technology and preferences) that lead to 
permanent changes in relative prices.  These shocks would influence only the 
exchange rate in the long run.  As an example, assume that labour productivity in 
traded goods increases permanently.  This change would increase the wage rate in 
both the traded and non-traded goods sectors and increase the equilibrium price for 
the non-traded goods sector (where labour productivity has not risen).  Since the 
money market is not affected, the CPI would be unchanged.  However, relation (4) 
would require that the exchange rate fall to compensate for the increase in the 
relative price of non-traded goods.  The long-run response to a permanent real shock, 
therefore, involves a change in the exchange rate but not the price level. 
As the above discussion indicates, the long-run association between the exchange 
rate and CPI would depend on the relative importance of monetary and real shocks.  
Monetary shocks would tend to be less important in economies where long-run inflation 
rates are low.  The long-run relation between the exchange rate and CPI is likely to be 
weak in such economies.11 Identification of this relation would be made difficult, 
moreover, by the presence of noise introduced by temporary shocks to the exchange rate. 
The long-run link between the exchange rate and prices can be related to 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) theory.  According to this theory, the exchange rate 
and the ratio of home and foreign price levels would exhibit the same proportional 
change in the long run.  This implication can be restated in terms of the behaviour of 
the real exchange rate, defined as the nominal exchange rate divided by the ratio of 
the price levels (i.e., the real exchange rate equals ttt PPS /
* ).  PPP implies that the 
real exchange rate will revert to a constant level in the long run.  In terms of the 
model with traded and non-traded goods discussed above, it can be seen from (4) that 
PPP will hold only if the ratio, γ/γ*, is constant in the long run.  As discussed above, 
however, this condition would not be satisfied if the home and foreign economies are 
subject to different permanent real shocks. 
 
3.   EVIDENCE FOR PAKISTAN 
For our empirical analysis we focus on the period since 1982, during 
which the dollar-rupee exchange rate was no longer fixed.  The behaviour of the 
 
11Choudhri and Hakura (2001) present evidence that the pass-through (in the short as well as the 
long run) is positively related to the average inflation rate across countries. 
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exchange rate (ER), the domestic consumer price index (CPI), and an index of 
foreign consumer prices (FCPI) are shown in Figure 1 from the first quarter of 
1982 to the second quarter of 2001.12 FCPI represents a weighted average of the 
consumer prices for Pakistan’s trading partners expressed in US dollars with 
weights based on Pakistan’s foreign trade.  Note that this index is influenced by 
each country’s US dollar exchange rate, and thus tends to be more variable than 
the consumer price series for individual countries expressed in national 
currencies. 
To examine the exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices, we estimate 
the effect of  ER on CPI, using FCPI as the control variable.  As Figure 1 indicates, 
these series exhibit a marked upward trend and appear to be non-stationary.  The 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test indicates that all three series contain a unit 
root.13 Estimation of the pass-through relation in levels could thus lead to finding a 
spurious relation between these variables.  The relation in first differences, on the 
other hand, would ignore relevant information if these variables were co-integrated.  
These variables would be co-integrated if the PPP holds and thus the real exchange 
rate for Pakistan (RER) is stationary.14 The path of RER is also shown in Figure 1.  
There has been a significant increase in RER (or a decrease in the real value of the 
rupee) during the 1980s and 1990s, and RER does not appear to converge to a 
constant value (or a deterministic path).15 The ADF test does not reject the 
hypothesis that RER (in logs) has a unit root.16 We assume that the exchange rate and 
prices are not co-integrated and thus estimate the relation between these variables in 
first differences. 
Estimates of the exchange rate pass-through are based on a regression 
equation of the following form: 
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12The source of all data is IMF, International Financial Statistics.  The series on the real effective 
exchange rate for Pakistan was used to construct the FCPI measure. 
13Applying the ADF test to each series expressed in logs, including an intercept, a deterministic 
trend, and using up to 4 lags, the test statistic does not reject the unit-root null at the 10 percent level for 
all three series. 
14In this case, there is a co-integrating relation between logs of ER, FCPI and CPI with a co-
integrating vector (1, 1, –1). 
15One possible explanation of the sharp increase in RER is that the traded-goods productivity gap 
between foreign countries and Pakistan has widened over the past two decades. 
16The ADF statistic with an intercept, trend, and 4 lags is –2.038 while the 10 percent critical 
value is –3.160. 
… … (2)   (5) 
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where lags are introduced to allow for gradual adjustment in prices and et is the error 
term.17 This equation can be used to derive estimates of the degree of the exchange 
rate pass-through over different periods. The pass-through coefficient after m periods 
is defined as the effect of a one unit increase in log ER in period t on log CPI in 
period t + m, and can be readily calculated from estimates of coefficients, namely the 
bi’s and ci’s , in (5). 
Equation (5) is estimated using quarterly data from 1982:1 to 2001:2.  Two 
estimates of this equation are shown in Table 1: one based on 4 lags for each 
variable, and the other using the Schwartz criterion to determine the optimal lag 
length for each variable.  In both cases, the effect of ER on CPI is insignificant.  
Estimates of the short-run pass-through, in fact, are negative.  For example, the 
regression equation using the Schwartz criterion implies that the pass-through 
coefficient is –0.02 in the current quarter, and –0.01 after 4 quarters.  Equation (5) 
focuses on the effect of the US dollar exchange rate.  For a given US dollar-rupee 
rate,  the  rupee  value  in  another  currency  could  vary  because  of  changes  in the 
 
Table 1 
Estimates of the Pass-through Relation 
Coefficient (t-value in Brackets) 
Variable (1) (2) 
Constant 0.007 (1.29) 0.007 (2.01) 
∆logCPIt–1 0.450 (3.56) 0.444 (3.71) 
∆logCPIt–2 –0.300 (–2.23) –0.311 (–2.42) 
∆logCPI t–3 0.275 (2.03) 0.283 (2.21) 
∆logCPI t–4 0.239 (1.89) 0.244 (2.05) 
∆logERt–1 0.004 (0.06)   
∆logERt–2 –0.027 (–0.45)   
∆logER t–3 –0.033 (–0.59)   
∆logER t–4 0.065 (1.18)   
∆logFCPIt –0.022 (–0.55) 0.005 (0.16) 
∆logFCPIt–1 0.009 (0.24)   
∆logFCPIt–2 –0.012 (–0.31)   
∆logFCPI t–3 0.007 (0.20)   
∆logFCPI t–4 0.043 (1.10)   
2R  0.260  0.307  
S.E.  of Regression 0.010  0.010  
Note: The dependent variable is ∆logCPIt.  The lags in regression (2) are determined by the Schwartz 
criterion. 
 
17For a discussion of a theoretical model that would suggest a pass-through relation of this form, 
see Choudhri and Hakura (2001). 
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currency’s exchange rate with respect to the US dollar.  The effect of such a change 
on consumer prices would operate via FCPI.  As Table 1 shows, however, even this 
variable does not have a significant impact on CPI.18 
The unresponsiveness of consumer prices to the exchange rate can be seen 
clearly by looking at the behaviour of the inflation rate after large rupee 
devaluations.  During the sample period, the rupee registered quarterly depreciations 
of more than 10 percent only three times, once at the beginning and twice at the end 
of the period.  Figure 2 shows the behaviour of the inflation rate for several quarters 
after these devaluations.  As the figure shows, the devaluations do not have any 
appreciable effect on the path of the inflation rate. 
Consumer prices include retail margins that depend on local services and are 
likely to be insensitive to the exchange rate.  It may be thought that the exchange rate 
may exert a stronger influence on the wholesale price index (WPI) that excludes 
retail margins and gives more weight to traded goods.  Equation (5) was thus re-
estimated replacing ∆logCPI by ∆logWPI.  The effect of ER remained insignificant 
even in this equation.19  These results are consistent with the recent view discussed in 
the previous section that even the traded goods prices respond weakly to the 
exchange rate. 
One limitation of the pass-through relation estimated above is that exchange 
rate changes  are  not  exogenous,  but  reflect  the  effect of a variety of shocks.  
Each shock may have a different pattern of effect on prices.  A structural model is 
needed to identify individual shocks and to trace the effect of each shock on the 
exchange rate and prices.  Although a thorough analysis along these lines is beyond 
the scope of this paper, we briefly explore this issue by estimating a simple Vector 
Auto-regression (VAR). 
We consider a VAR with two endogenous variables, ∆logER and ∆logCPI, 
and one exogenous variable, ∆logFCPI.  In this simple framework, we can 
distinguish between two types of shocks: (1) shocks to asset markets and (2) shocks 
to goods markets.  Asset market shocks are thought to account for much of the 
observed exchange rate volatility.  It is thus interesting to examine how these shocks 
pass-through to consumer prices.  To identify these shocks we exploit the assumption 
that information about goods markets becomes available with a lag, so that asset 
market shocks are independent of the contemporaneous value of ∆logCPI.  Under 
this assumption, the reduced-form shock to ∆logER  can  be viewed as an asset 
market shock, and Cholesky decomposition can be used to estimate the response of 
consumer prices to this shock.  
 
18We also estimated (5) after redefining ER as the effective exchange rate (i.e., the price of a 
basket of currencies using Pakistan’s trade weights), and FCPI as the corresponding foreign consumer 
price index.  The influence of the effective exchange rate was statistically insignificant in this equation as 
well. 
19The results are available on request from the authors. 
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Figure 3 shows the response of ∆logCPI to a one standard-deviation shock to 
∆logER over 10 quarters.20 Two standard deviation bands for this impulse response 
function are also shown in the figure.  The response of the rate of inflation to the 
shock is close to zero not only in the first year but even after two years.  The 
variance-decomposition analysis shows that shocks to ∆logER explain 97 percent of 
the variance of this variable after 10 quarters and 96 percent of the variance after 20 
quarters.  These results suggest that asset market shocks dominate exchange rate 
changes, and a weak response of CPI to these shocks accounts for the absence of a 
significant exchange rate pass-through. 
Our empirical analysis does not support the results of Ahmad and Ali (1999) 
that a devaluation has a significant impact on inflation.  We believe that their results 
differ from ours because they estimate a model that is based on some fairly 
restrictive assumptions.  For example, they assume that there is a complete exchange 
rate pass-through to import prices.  This assumption is important for their results, but 
is not supported by recent theoretical models or empirical evidence.  They also 
estimate relations linking the price level and the exchange rate  in (log) levels.  As 
noted above, estimation of relations between non-stationary variables in the level 
form can produce spurious results.21 
 
4.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper challenges the popular view that devaluations tend to cause 
inflation in Pakistan.  The empirical analysis in the paper finds no evidence of a 
significant pass-through of rupee depreciations to consumer prices in the short run.  
This finding is consistent with recent theoretical analysis that suggests a weak short-
run association between exchange rate changes and inflation.  It would appear, 
therefore, that concerns about the inflationary consequences of devaluation in 
Pakistan are somewhat misplaced.  Stability of the nominal exchange rate may be 
desirable for many reasons, but not because of fears that exchange rate fluctuations 
will impose an inflationary cost on the economy. 
In the last two decades, the rupee has depreciated significantly not only in 
nominal but also in real terms.  This long-period loss of rupee’s real value implies 
that  even  in  the  long run, Pakistan’s inflation rate has not fully reflected the rate of 
rupee depreciation.  One interesting issue that remains to be explored is: What 
factors have caused the long-term change in the real exchange rate, and what effects 
has this had on the Pakistan economy. 
 
20The VAR includes 4 lags of each endogenous variable.  A constant term, and the current and  4 
lagged values of ∆logFCPI are also included in each VAR equation.  The impulse response function is 
based on a Cholesky decomposition with ∆logER as the first variable. 
21They claim that their relations are co-integrated.  Their co-integration test (an ADF test on the 
residuals), however, is applied after imposing a number of ad hoc restrictions on each relation.  We 
eschew estimating our pass-through relation in the level form in view of the indication of a unit root in the 
real exchange rate. 
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Women’s Role in Domestic Decision-making  
in Pakistan: Implications for  
Reproductive Behaviour 
 
NAUSHIN MAHMOOD* 
 
Women’s involvement in domestic decision-making is recognised as a distinct 
aspect of their autonomy with implications for reproductive behaviour.  Using data from 
the Pakistan Fertility and Family Planning Survey 1996-97, this study examines the 
extent of Pakistani women’s participation in household decision-making relative to their 
husbands and other family members, and determines its effects on the demand for 
children and contraceptive use in both urban and rural settings. The findings reveal that 
women’s decision-making authority is clearly related to the context in which they live, as 
urban women have a say in household matters, almost equal to their husbands’, whereas 
most rural women report that their husbands and other family members have a 
predominant role in household decisions with regard to seeking medical treatment for a 
sick child or to make purchases of household items. The results also indicate that women 
with greater freedom to go outside home alone are also more likely to participate in 
domestic decisions, and the linkage is stronger for rural than for urban women. The 
multivariate analysis reveals that the effect of decision-making variables on measures of 
reproductive behaviour is strongly, conditioned by socio-economic and demographic 
factors, implying that measures of women’s empowerment give only a partial explanation 
of the likelihood of women’s desire to have fewer children and to increase contraceptive 
use. The results suggest that Pakistani women’s enhanced role in household decision-
making has an effect on achieving gender equality and fertility reduction outcomes—
goals that are central to population and development policy. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Women’s role in household decision-making is identified as an important 
dimension of her status and autonomy which in turn has implications for reproductive 
behaviour.  The theoretical and empirical research on the relationship between 
women’s status and demographic behaviour has revealed that the more conventional 
measures of education, employment, marital status duration, etc., are inadequate 
proxies for their status and do not explain women’s decision-making autonomy, their 
control over economic resources and the power relations dynamics of families—factors 
that can significantly influence women’s reproductive intentions and behaviour [Balk 
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(1994); Jejeebhoy (1996); Govindasamy and Malhotra (1996); Sathar and Kazi 
(1997)].  Yet, few studies have measured these dimensions of women’s status, and 
fewer have thus far used these direct measures in different socio-cultural contexts 
[Basu (1992); Morgan and Niraula (1995); Sathar and Kazi (2000)]. 
The nature and extent of women’s involvement in decision-making and its 
linkage with reproductive behaviour is not a much researched topic in the social 
context of Pakistan. Most studies of gender-related aspects of demographic change in 
Pakistan have used such commonly available measures as women’s education, 
economic activity, and attitudes towards family planning to explain their fertility and 
contraceptive use behaviour or demand for children [Syed (1978); Shah (1986); Sathar, 
et al. (1988); Mahmood and Ringheim (1997)].  These analyses have lacked 
assessment of the critical dimensions of women’s status that are considered to enhance 
their relative position within the household in relation to demographic behaviour. This 
is largely because the routinely available fertility and demographic surveys do not 
provide adequate information on direct measures of women’s status.  At the same time, 
small-scale studies, including qualitative analysis, that have focussed on assessing 
various aspects of women’s status and gender relations parameters have lacked the 
advantages offered by large-scale socio-demographic surveys. However, with the 
availability of the nationally representative survey of Fertility and Family Planning 
(1996-97)1 which incorporates several direct measures of women’s position in the 
household, it becomes possible to address some of the questions relating to women’s 
decision-making autonomy, gender inequality, and reproductive behaviour.  
Recognising that Pakistan is a patriarchical society exhibiting high levels of 
gender inequality in social and economic spheres, a closer look at women’s 
participation in domestic decision-making and its relation with reproductive choices 
and fertility attitudes would provide further insight into family building behaviour—
a question of great relevance to achieving gender equality and further declines in 
fertility. 
The objective of the study is to examine women’s role in household decision-
making and see whether it is linked to their freedom of movement and reproductive 
behaviour, more specifically in urban and rural areas with distinct social and cultural 
characteristics. The main questions addressed in the paper are: 
 — First, to what extent are Pakistani women involved in domestic decision-
making relative to their husbands and other family members, and how 
closely are standard proxies of women’s status, i.e., education, employment, 
marital status duration, etc., associated with domestic and reproductive 
decision-making authority? 
 
1The survey was conducted by the National Institute of Population Studies (NIPS), Islamabad, in 
collaboration with the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM). For details of the 
sample size, design, and preliminary findings of the survey, see NIPS and LSHTM (1998). 
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 — Second, do women with a greater role in decision-making and greater 
freedom of movement also exhibit desirable demographic outcomes—such as 
higher contraceptive use and lower demand for children, and how do these 
relationships vary between the urban and rural settings or across regions? 
These questions are of special significance in Pakistan’s social context 
because of large variation in individual and regional characteristics of surveyed 
women, and the complex nature of gender relations and fertility-limiting behaviour 
in urban and rural settings.  
 
THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 
Deriving from both the theoretical and empirical work that identifies the 
relationship between women’s status and demographic behaviour [Mason (1984, 
1993, 1998); Dyson and Moore (1983); Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender (2002)], it is 
recognised that a woman’s involvement in domestic decision-making is a distinct 
aspect of her autonomy.  For example, women who have a greater say in household 
matters are also likely to have freedom of movement, access to resources, and 
equality in their relationship with the spouse. 
In determining the connection between women’s decision-making autonomy 
and reproductive attitudes and behaviour it is important to understand the social and 
cultural context in which they live. In relatively modern and gender-egalitarian 
societies, one would expect greater female autonomy and freedom of movement on 
account of widespread schooling, greater opportunities for work, and equality of 
gender relations, whereas in traditional and patriarchical settings women’s actions 
and behaviour at the individual and community levels are influenced by social 
norms, division of gender roles, and the variability in gender relations. 
It is argued that religious values and cultural practices in traditional settings 
restrict women’s decision-making options and freedom of movement at the same 
time that they encourage and favour their reproductive role. Recognising the 
importance of the family as the basic social unit and the complementarity of male 
and female roles in such societies, it is likely that women tend to play a major role in 
household matters and exert substantial influence on domestic and reproductive 
decisions because they fall within the socially prescribed female domain. It is 
alternatively argued that the “outside” role of men and their control of the economic 
resources empower them to have more influence on household decision-making, 
whereas women’s position and role within the household depends much more on 
their social and economic status, access to education, health care, job opportunities, 
etc. Thus, the association between women’s decision-making autonomy and 
demographic outcome would be affected by their social and economic class and the 
variability and complexity of gender relations within and across societies. Research 
findings, however, support the view that women’s status is often measured by socio-
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economic background factors, i.e., women’s education and/or employment, which 
appear to have an indirect and more speculative effect on fertility change [Mason 
(1993)], and need to be supplemented by more direct measures of women’s status so 
as to assess the underlying process of demographic behaviour.  Hence, it is of 
interest to understand how the constraints of gender inequality and limited decision-
making power of women in less modern societies like that of Pakistan influence the 
reproductive attitudes and behaviour of couples. 
 
SOCIO-CULTURAL BACKGROUND 
The social structure of Pakistan is based on deep-rooted cultural and 
traditional beliefs and values. The family system is patriarchical and patrilocal with 
strong gender biases perpetuated in society. Men have a dominant role as the 
household head, with the primary responsibility of financially supporting the family. 
However, women and children contribute significantly to farm and agricultural work 
especially in rural areas.  There is generally a preference for joint family system, 
with a strong desire for having more sons than daughters. Men participate more in 
the formal outside-home affairs and decision-making in the community, while 
women tend to play a major role within home in terms of nurturing of children and 
maintenance of household.  Overall, gender inequality in social and economic 
spheres is evident from the wide gap between male and female literacy and 
educational attainment (especially in rural areas), low female work participation in 
the formal sector, and high mortality among girl children (1-4 years) and mothers 
[Mahmood and Nayab (1998)]. People living in different regions/provinces speak 
their own local languages, especially in rural areas, and can be distinguished by their 
distinct ethno-linguistic groups and social customs. Despite this regional and cultural 
diversity, people are united by one common religion, Islam (97 percent of the 
population).  Given that Pakistan has a large, homogeneously  Muslim population, it 
is likely that religious beliefs and values in combination with low educational 
attainment levels and limited economic and social autonomy among women 
contribute to a lack of self-efficacy in adopting the small family size norms and 
fertility-limiting behaviour. 
On the demographic front, fertility level has declined only recently from a high 
level of more than six births per woman in the early 1970s to around five births per 
woman in the 1990s, [NIPS (2001)], suggesting a slow-paced fertility transition in 
Pakistan.  The modest decline in fertility has been associated with increasing levels of 
contraceptive use and rising age at marriage, especially of females, and the downward 
trend in family size desires [Sathar and Casterline (1998); Soomro (2000)].  
Contraceptive prevalence rate has risen from a low level of 6 percent in the 1970s to 
about 28 percent in the 1990s. There is an evidence of falling fertility desires as indicated 
by wanted total fertility rate of less than four children. At the same time, it is reported that 
about 44 percent of women have expressed the desire for no more children, and             
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33 percent of the women surveyed have unmet need for family planning [NIPS (2001)].  
Women often mention their husband’s disapproval of family planning as one of the 
reasons for non-use of contraception and indicate that the influence of husbands in 
household and reproductive decisions is dominant [Mahmood (1998)]. 
These socio-cultural conditions, in combination with the issue of unmet 
contraceptive need, pose a challenging situation for policy-makers and population 
programme managers to effectively implement fertility reduction objectives of the 
programme. If the socio-cultural set up is portrayed with men as the dominant force in 
all aspects of family life, then the population programme needs to enhance male 
involvement and approval for family planning. Alternatively, if most of family 
planning services are provided to women only, then whether they are largely 
autonomous in decision-making or depend on husbands’ consultation and involvement 
is an important aspect to be studied in the socio-cultural context of Pakistan. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
The data set used in this study is the Pakistan Fertility and Family Planning 
Survey (PFFPS) of 1996-97, a nationally representative sample of 8,362 women between 
the ages of 15–49 years.  The present analysis is limited to 7,584 currently married 
women in the weighted sample for whom fertility-limiting behaviour and decision-
making autonomy is a relevant issue.  The data includes many questions on women’s say 
in household matters such as: ‘Who makes the final decision about child treatment in 
case of illness?’; ‘Who decides about household purchases including food, clothing etc?’ 
The availability of this information, with a wide variety of background, household and 
socio-economic indicators, and detailed measures of fertility and contraceptive use, 
provides the basis for examining the gender inequality aspects and reproductive 
behaviour of women in urban and rural areas of Pakistan. 
The methods employed to study the hypothesised relationships between the 
predictor and dependent variables include bivariate and multivariate analyses. First, 
variations in women’s household decision-making are examined by their background 
socio-economic characteristics. The extent of women’s participation in household 
matters is measured by the simple percentage responses in relation to selected 
characteristics in bivariate relationships. The multivariate analysis is then used to 
determine which characteristics of women are significant in explaining women’s 
decision-making involvement in the household. The analysis pertains to currently 
married urban and rural women for whom having a say in household affairs vis-à-vis 
their husbands and other family members is an active issue. 
These results are then examined using logistic regression models to see 
whether—or to what extent—the decision-making variables ultimately explain the 
reproductive behaviour of women.  The analysis is done for urban and rural women 
separately to see the differential effect of selected factors on the dependent variables 
in the two types of settings. 
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Dependent Variables 
The multivariate analysis undertaken to determine the effect of selected 
predictor variables on reproductive behaviour analysis focuses on two dependent 
variables: the desire for children coded as 1 if a woman wants no more children, and 
zero otherwise; and current use of contraceptives defined as 1 if a woman is using 
any method, and zero otherwise. Because of the dichotomous dependent variables, 
logistic regressions are used to examine the net effect of women’s position variables 
on desired fertility and contraceptive use after controlling for background 
characteristics. 
  
Independent Variables 
Among several questions asked the women about the decision-making pattern 
within households and their freedom of moving outside home, only those questions 
are used in the analysis that are least speculative and are relevant to the objectives of 
the study. 
 
Decision-making Autonomy 
 A woman’s overall input in household decisions is a key indicator of her 
authority and importance within the family [Govindasamy and Malhotra (1996); 
Sathar and Kazi (2000)].  On the decision-making issue,2 three questions3 are used to 
assess women’s final say in household matters: ‘Who usually takes the final decision 
about treatment when a child is sick?’; ‘Who takes final decision about what to buy 
for food?’; and ‘Who takes the final decision to buy clothes for yourself? ’ The 
responses available to these questions are: (1) respondent; (2) husband; (3) 
jointly/mother-in-law/others. These responses indicate the preference for egalitarian 
or independent decision-making in women’s everyday life matters, and their ability 
to influence household finances, which is considered largely a male domain in 
Pakistani society. The responses to the two questions on household purchases 
including food and clothing show similar distributions and are merged together to 
reflect the broader nature of domestic decisions involving financial and consumption 
matters. 
 
2Domestic decision-making in Pakistan’s social context usually involves the opinion and input of 
all family members including mother-in-law or elders in the family, especially in a joint or extended 
family set-up. However, the questions chosen to examine women’s involvement in decision-making 
pertain to only those which indicate women’s reporting about making final decisions vis-à-vis their 
husbands and other family members in household matters. 
3A separate question on reproductive decision-making was also asked the women who reported 
the first use of method: ‘Who decided to use this particular method?’ ‘Was it mainly the wife’s decision, 
her husband’s or someone else’s?’ This question pertains to ever users only which reduces the sample to 
less than half, and hence is not included as a decision-making variable in the analysis. However, the 
survey report shows that the wife’s decision to use a particular method has almost the same weight as the 
husband’s for both urban and rural women [NIPS and LSHTM (1998), p. 139]. 
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Freedom of Movement 
 Restrictions on women’s movement outside the house are considered to deny 
them opportunities to participate in schooling or employment, limit their access to 
resources and information, and reduce their ability to take care of themselves and 
their children in case of illness [Jejeebhoy (1996); Khan (1998)]. On the mobility 
issue, two questions are used to measure women’s independence to go out of the 
house: ‘Within the last four weeks, have you been outside this village/neighbourhood 
for any purpose without the company of any adult?’; and ‘Could you go by yourself 
to a health clinic/hospital if you needed or would you have to be accompanied by 
someone else?’  The responses to these questions indicate women’s freedom to travel 
alone to the market, friends or relatives, or a health centre without being escorted or 
seeking permission from the husband or another family member—chiefly an issue 
for relatively younger Pakistani women. 
 
Husband-Wife Communication 
 If couples can openly discuss family matters and the desire for children with 
each other, chances of mutual influence and agreement in desired fertility and 
contraceptive use are likely to be higher [Mahmood (1998)]. But communication 
between husband and wife may be hampered by social norms of modesty and 
privacy concerning  sexuality, as well as by the subordinate position of women in 
Pakistani society.  Using information on whether the woman has talked to her spouse 
about family planning matters in the past year, a variable on husband-wife 
communication is included in the analysis as a parameter reflecting gender relations 
within a household. 
In addition to indicators of these specific dimensions of gender inequality and 
decision-making, selected background characteristics that can affect both women’s 
position and reproductive behaviour are included in the analysis. These are 
education, employment status, paid work, and cultural and economic differences 
represented by the four regions/provinces. Because the demographic outcomes are 
greatly influenced by lifecycle factors, women’s age, parity, and marriage duration 
are included as control variables in the analysis. Almost all variables used are 
categorical/dummies to examine which category of any selected variable is important 
in explaining variations in the dependent variables. 
  
RESULTS 
 
(a)  Background Characteristics of Women 
In all, about 70 percent of women are rural (5340) and 30 percent urban 
(2245), with about 48 percent having more than four living children.  The majority of 
surveyed women reside in the Punjab province (58 percent) and the least minority in 
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Balochistan region (5 percent), whereas the proportions residing in Sindh and the 
NWFP are 22 percent and 14 percent, respectively.  A further disaggregation of the 
sample by urban and rural areas shows wide variations in characteristics of selected 
subgroups of women. 
The percentage distributions of currently married urban and rural women with 
selected background characteristics are presented in Figure 1. Education levels of 
these women are very low, as about 86 percent of rural and 49 percent of urban 
women have never attended school or are exposed to only informal or Quranic 
learning. Rural women, in particular, indicate extremely low levels of educational 
attainment, as about 11 percent have completed primary and middle level schooling 
and only about 3 percent have attained secondary and above levels compared with 
urban women of those levels of schooling—24 percent and 27 percent, respectively. 
Even more alarming is the situation that the vast majority of women (85.8 percent 
urban and 78.8 percent rural) report as not being engaged in any employment 
activity. Of the remaining women who report to be working, a slightly higher 
percentage—10.2 percent—are engaged in self-employment in urban areas as 
compared to 17.3 percent in rural areas, and only about 4 percent report to be 
working for someone else or in cash-based economic activities (see Appendix Table 
1 for detailed percentage distribution of these variables). These figures almost 
certainly underreport the contribution of women to their family work and reflect 
women’s own perceptions about the economic value of their work, and the worth 
given to women’s work in society. There is evidence from other research studies in 
developing countries like India and Egypt on underreporting of female work and 
biases in the estimation and measurement of women’s participation in the labour 
force that arise mainly because of poorly constructed questionnaires, misperceptions 
of male interviews/respondents, and ambiguous definitions [Anker (1981); Anker, 
Khan and Gupta (1988)]. 
The percentage distributions of the two measures of decision-making, and 
women’s freedom of movement along with the two dependent variables, are shown 
in Figure 2 for urban and rural areas. With regard to decision-making for child’s 
treatment in case of illness, urban women appear to have an equal say in the 
household in comparison with their husbands (39 percent), whereas rural women are 
much less empowered than their husbands to make the final decision in this regard 
(23 percent wives vs. 55 percent husbands). The input by mother-in-law and other 
family members is about 21 percent in both urban and rural areas. In case of having a 
final decision regarding food and clothing purchases, about 36 percent of urban 
women report their input as almost equally matched by their husbands’—37 percent, 
whereas only 21 percent of rural women have the authority to make such decisions 
as compared with 50 percent by husbands. The involvement of other family members 
in decisions about household purchases is about 28 percent in both types of area. 
Thus, it is evident that domestic decision-making is not primarily a woman’s domain  
*Various categories of characteristics are measured in the order as:  
Age = 15-25, 25-34, 35+;  Education = none/informal, below  matric and above;  
Region = NWFP, Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan;  Paid work = yes, no. 
 
Fig. 1.  Percentage Distribution of Currently Married Urban and Rural Women, by Background  
Characteristics, Pakistan, 1996-97. 
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*Various categories of measures of decision-making and mobility are: 
Mobility = gone outside home alone, no;  Can go to hospital alone = yes, accompanied/depends; 
Decision on child treatment = wife, husband, jointly/others;  Decision HH purchases = wife, husband, others; Contraceptive use = yes, no. 
 
Fig. 2. Percentage Distribution of Currently Married Urban and Rural Women, by Measures of Decision-making, 
Mobility, and Contraceptive Use, Pakistan, 1996-97. 
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in rural areas but largely involves input by the husband and other family members, 
while exposure to urban living enhances women’s decision-making authority, 
making their point of view have the same weight as the husband’s. 
The percentage distribution for other measures of women’s position within 
households is supportive of the view that only a small minority have the freedom to 
go outside the house alone for various purposes.  For example, only about 15 percent 
of rural and 24 percent of urban women report to be autonomous in moving alone, 
and about 19 percent of rural and 35 percent of urban women exercise the freedom to 
go to a hospital/clinic independently, reflecting very limited mobility among rural 
women. 
With regard to various aspects of reproductive behaviour, it is evident from 
Figure 2 that of currently married non-pregnant women, about 36 percent of urban 
and only 18.6 percent of rural women have reported using a contraceptive method. 
As for other indicators of reproductive and family planning behaviour, almost one-
half (49.5 percent) of urban and 39 percent of rural women express the desire for no 
more children.  Also, more than half of rural women (57.8 percent) and almost half 
of urban women (48.7 percent) have never discussed family planning with their 
husbands (see Appendix Table 1 for the percentage distribution of women for all 
variables used in the analysis, including life-course factors such as age, parity, and 
marriage duration). 
 
(b)  Variations in Women’s Decision-making 
 
Decision About Child Treatment 
The results of bivariate relationships between selected background 
characteristics of women and decision-making about child treatment in case of 
illness are presented in Figure 3 for urban and rural women separately. Overall, 
about 39.3 percent of urban and 23 percent of rural women participate in final 
decisions about child treatment. Variations in final decision-making by levels of 
education appear to be large, especially in case of rural women.  For example, only 
22 percent of rural women with no formal education indicate their involvement in 
making the final decision about child treatment, as compared to 51.2 percent with 
secondary and above levels of education and 25 percent with primary and middle 
level of education. Urban women, on the other hand, indicate less variation in 
decision-making by levels of education, i.e., 36 percent for illiterate vs. 41 and 44 
percent for below-matric and higher levels. Clearly, substantial variability exists in 
women’s reported decision-making regarding regional affiliation. As Figure 3 
indicates, women living in the Punjab have the highest participation in decision-
making (40.2 percent urban and 30.7 percent rural), whereas women residing in rural 
parts of Sindh and Balochistan have much less say in domestic decisions—only 11.8 
and  4.2  percent,  respectively.  Work  participation  and  employment  status  do not  
 *Same as described in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
Fig. 3.  Percentage of Currently Married Urban and Rural Women who Report Taking the Final Decision about 
Treatment of a Sick Child in the Household, Pakistan, 1996-97. 
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appear to enhance women’s decision-making power, especially in rural areas, where 
only a small proportion of women is engaged in paid employment.  
Women’s ability to move outside the house alone indicates their independence 
and freedom of movement, which are likely to enhance their autonomy in decision-
making aspects of their domestic lives. As is evident from Figure 3, women’s 
mobility measures significantly contribute to increasing their involvement in 
decision-making as more than half of urban women and between 38 to 48 percent of 
rural women who can go outside the house or to a hospital/clinic alone report their 
input in the final decision about child treatment.  Among lifecycle factors, the results 
are as expected, as older women with high parity and longer marriage duration have 
a greater say in household matters than the relatively younger and low parity women. 
(See Appendix Table 2 for variations in women’s reported decision-making in case 
of treatment of sick child for all factors used in the analysis). 
 
Decisions About Household Purchases  
Variations in women’s final decision-making for household purchases 
including food items and clothing by selected background characteristics are 
presented in Figure 4.  In all, about 35.5 percent of urban and 21 percent of rural 
women have reported their involvement in final decisions about household 
purchases. This reveals that women’s involvement in decisions about household 
purchases is somewhat less than that observed in the case of treatment of sick child, 
reflecting that women have a somewhat greater say in the household in problems 
related to nurturing or taking care of children—a socially prescribed female domain. 
However, the pattern of distribution shows that women with higher levels of 
education, greater mobility, paid work, and longer marriage duration report having 
greater participation in final decision-making about household purchases than those 
with no formal schooling, limited mobility, no paid work, and less marriage duration. 
Furthermore, women living in rural parts of the four regions have reported a much 
lower input in household purchase decisions than their counterparts in urban areas. 
For example, 29.6 percent of rural women in Punjab and only 8.7 percent of those 
residing in rural parts of the NWFP, 8 percent in Sindh, and 7.7 percent in 
Balochistan report their involvement in domestic decision-making.  This reveals that 
a large majority of rural women, except for those living in the Punjab, have very 
little say in decision-making, especially in the case of making household purchase 
decisions.  Compared with this, 34.5 percent of urban women in the Punjab, 40.8 
percent in Sindh, 26 percent in the NWFP, and about 17 percent in Balochistan have 
reported their participation in household purchase matters.  This indicates that there 
is substantial variability in women’s input in domestic decision-making between 
urban and rural areas across regions. (See Appendix Table 3 for variations in final 
decision-making in household purchases for all factors used in the analysis). 
  
*Same as described in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
Fig. 4.  Percentage of Currently Married Urban and Rural Women who Report Taking Final Decision about Household 
Purchases, i.e., Food and Clothing, Pakistan,1996-97. 
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(c) Multivariate Analysis of Domestic Decision-making 
In order to examine which characteristics of women are important in 
determining their decision-making authority in the household, two-category 
dependent variables with regard to child treatment and household purchases (defined 
as one for wife and zero otherwise) are used for urban and rural women separately. 
In logistic regression models, the odds ratios of making decisions regarding child 
treatment and household purchases show the magnitude of increase in the dependent 
variable for each unit increase in the independent variable in comparison with the 
omitted (reference) category of the discrete variables. This analysis allows to 
determine the extent to which background characteristics and mobility factors predict 
women’s domestic decision-making after controlling for lifecycle and socio-
economic variables. The regression results of the two measures of decision-making, 
i.e., child treatment and household purchases, are presented in Table 1 for urban and 
rural women. 
As expected, age and marriage duration increase the likelihood of women’s 
participation in domestic decision-making. The results indicate that relatively older 
women and with longer marriage duration are between 1.5 to 2.0 times more likely 
to make household decisions than women in younger ages and less marriage 
duration.  It is also evident from Table 1 that after controlling for lifecycle factors 
and other background characteristics, the measures of women’s mobility have a 
significant impact on enhancing women’s decision-making input in the household. In 
fact, the autonomy to go to a hospital/clinic alone shows the strongest effect on the 
dependent variables. This means that woman’s freedom of movement and her ability 
to go to a hospital or clinic independently is important to increasing her involvement 
in domestic decision-making, particularly for rural women. This relationship 
indicates that Pakistani women’s autonomy regarding domestic decision-making is 
linked with their mobility status within the household. Regional variations indicate 
that Punjabi women, especially in rural areas, have much greater involvement in 
decision-making than those living in other regions. This may be reflective of the 
Punjabi culture where women are relatively more egalitarian, make significant 
contribution to farm work, and are given more importance in the family than their 
rural counterparts in other regions. The finding that women in Punjab are relatively 
more empowered to participate in decisions relating to children and household 
responsibilities concurs with results of the study in rural Punjab that shows higher 
participation of women in domestic spheres than other dimensions of autonomy 
[Sathar and Kazi (1997)]. 
It also appears that women’s education does not play a significant role in 
enhancing women’s participation in decisions about child treatment except for those 
few rural women with secondary and above levels of education. For household 
purchases, only urban women’s education makes a significant difference in 
exercising  decision-making  authority.  With employment, the situation is even more  
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Table 1 
Odds Ratios of Final Decision-making Regarding Child Treatment and Household 
Purchases as a Function of Women’s Mobility and Background  
Characteristics, Pakistan, 1996-97 
Decision Regarding Child 
Treatment 
Decision Regarding 
Household Purchases 
Urban 
Women 
(n=2011) 
Rural 
Women 
(n=4609) 
Urban 
Women 
(n=2245) 
Rural 
Women 
(n=5340) 
    Variables Odds Ratios Odds Ratios 
Women’s Age     
15–24 (r) – – – – 
25–34 2.20*** 1.42 1.53** 1.29** 
35+ 2.19*** 1.11 1.97** 1.10 
Marriage Duration     
<10  (r) – – – – 
10–19 1.22* 1.88*** 1.86*** 1.70*** 
20+ 1.46 2.30*** 1.76*** 2.57*** 
Women’s Education     
None/Informal  (r) – – – – 
Primary and Middle 1.19 0.96 1.48*** 0.95 
Secondary and Above 1.07 3.17*** 1.63*** 1.36 
Paid Work      
Not Working  (r) – – – – 
Yes 1.37** 0.86* 0.96 0.55*** 
Region     
Balochistan  (r) – – – – 
NWFP 0.85 2.30** 1.60 0.78 
Punjab 2.20** 5.91*** 1.91* 3.64*** 
Sindh 2.51** 2.84*** 2.57** 1.12 
Mobility     
No  (r) – – – – 
Yes 2.36*** 1.13 2.53*** 2.99*** 
Go to Hospital Alone      
Accompanied/Depends  (r) – – – – 
Yes 1.50*** 3.48*** 2.53*** 2.99*** 
Husband-Wife Communication      
No  (r) – – – – 
Yes 1.32** 1.20** 1.10 1.13 
Significant at *P≤ .05; **P≤ .01 and ***P≤ .001. 
(r) = reference category. 
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complex. The results show that effects of paid employment are contrary to 
expectations as women engaged in economic activity are less likely to participate in 
household decision-making, except for those few urban women who are expected to 
be engaged in cash employment.  The odds ratios of less than 1.00 for rural women 
in paid work suggest that their employment status tends slightly to increase chances 
of their husbands’/others’ to make household decisions. This supports the contention 
that in settings such as Pakistan, where gender norms support the male provider role 
and large proportion of women are engaged in unpaid family help or self-
employment in rural areas, the small proportion of women engaged in paid 
employment tend to underreport their economic contribution to their families, and 
this may undermine the possibility of their gaining and exercising decision-making 
power within the household. This needs to be investigated further in the light of the 
circumstances of the small proportion of women engaged in paid employment and 
the type of work in which these women are involved.  More interestingly, husband-
wife communication has a significant effect on decisions regarding child treatment, 
while it is not significant for decisions regarding household purchases, for both urban 
and rural women. 
 
(d)  Women’s Decision-making Role and Reproductive Behaviour 
To determine whether women’s involvement in household decision-making is 
important in affecting demographic outcome, two measures of reproductive 
behaviour are used for analysis: wanting no more children and current contraceptive 
use. Logistic regression models are estimated to show the relationships between 
selected explanatory variables and the two dependent variables. 
 
Desire for Children 
The desire for children is categorised into a dichotomous variable indicating 
wanting no more children equal to 1 and zero otherwise.  The regression results of 
the predictors of women wanting no more children are shown in Table 2.  An odds 
ratio above 1.00 indicates greater likelihood of wanting no more children, whereas 
the odds ratios below 1.00 indicate the opposite. The results are presented in three 
models. First, only measures of decision-making and mobility are considered in 
model 1.  Then additional control variables such as age, parity, women’s education 
and their work status are included in model 2.  And, finally, controls for region are 
added in model 3.  This approach permits to determine whether background factors, 
especially education, employment, and regional differentials tend to capture the 
effect of decision-making variables through these measures of women’s position on 
reproductive behaviour.  This analysis presents separate models for urban and rural 
women. 
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Table 2 
Odds Ratios of Desire for No More Children as a Function of Decision-making and 
Socio-demographic Variables among Currently Married Urban and 
Rural Women, Pakistan, 1996-97 
Urban Women Rural Women 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Variables Odds Ratios Odds Ratios 
A. Decision-making Variables       
Decision for Child Treatment       
Mother-in-law/Other (r) – – – – – – 
Wife 2.27*** 1.48** 1.48** 1.76*** 1.04 1.01 
Husband 1.74*** 1.20 1.21 2.04*** 1.25* 1.27* 
Decision HH Purchases       
Mother-in-law (r) – – – – – – 
Wife 1.66*** 1.26* 1.29* 2.38*** 1.58*** 1.51*** 
Husband 1.43*** 1.15 1.16 1.76*** 1.15 1.19 
Mobility       
No (r) – – – – – – 
Yes 1.23* 1.09 1.13 1.39*** 1.11 1.09 
Can Go to Hospital Alone?       
Accompanied/Depends (r) – – – – – – 
Alone 1.06 0.96 0.94 1.70*** 1.18 1.09 
Husband-Wife Communication       
No (r) – – – – – – 
Yes 2.58*** 2.56*** 2.41*** 2.26** 2.37*** 2.29** 
B. Socio-demographic Indicators       
Women’s Age       
15–24 (r) – – – – – – 
25–34  2.65*** 2.58***  3.24*** 3.19*** 
35+  4.19*** 4.06***  7.81*** 7.64*** 
Parity       
<4 Children (r) – – – – – – 
4+ Children  3.23*** 3.26***  5.21*** 5.49*** 
Women’s Education       
None/Informal (r) – – – – – – 
Primary and Middle  1.01 0.99  1.61*** 1.48*** 
Secondary and Above  1.11 1.16  2.81*** 2.62*** 
Paid Work       
No (r) – – – – – – 
Yes  0.72* 0.73*  1.00 0.95 
C. Region of Residence       
Balochistan (r) – – – – – – 
NWFP   1.18   1.58** 
Punjab   1.44   2.11*** 
Sindh   1.11   1.46** 
–2 log Likelihood 2918.6 2576.2 2568.1 6460.1 5065.8 5035.3 
(N) (2245)    (5340)  
Significant at *P≤ .05; **P≤ .01 and ***P≤ .001. 
(r) = reference category. 
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The results in Table 2 indicate that decision-making variables are significantly 
related to women’s desire for no additional children. As model 1 shows, the odds of 
desiring no more children are higher for wives than their husbands or other family 
members with regard to child treatment and household purchases decision-making. 
This means that most women who participate actively in household matters are also 
more likely to desire fewer children. However, women’s mobility and freedom of 
movement indices have a strong relationship with the desire for no more children for 
rural women only, and a mild effect in case of urban women. Also of interest is the 
finding that husband-wife communication is important in increasing the likelihood of 
wanting no more children as the variable shows the strongest effect for both urban 
and rural women. 
In model 2, the strength of decision-making variables is substantially reduced 
for wives and becomes insignificant for husbands after introducing controls for 
socio-demographic indicators.  Also notable is the finding that the effect of mobility 
factors observed earlier for rural women is wiped off in model 2.  As expected, the 
lifecycle factors such as age and parity have a powerful influence on reducing 
desired fertility with relatively older (35 years and above) and high parity women (4 
or more children), showing the strongest effect particularly in case of rural women. 
More interestingly, education plays no significant role in determining the desire for 
no more children for urban women, whereas this effect is strong for rural women.  
As observed from Table 2 (model 2), the odds of rural women with primary as well 
as secondary and above schooling are about 1.4 to 2.8 times higher than those for 
women with no education.  The effects of paid work are somewhat confounding as 
the odds ratios of less than 1.00 indicate the tendency of those few working women 
to deviate from desiring no more children than those not working.  Such an effect is 
mildly significant for urban women only, and insignificant for rural women. 
The inclusion of region in model 3 does not change the picture much. As we 
can see from Table 2, region of residence itself has no strong effect on desired 
fertility of urban women, while it shows significant variations among rural women. 
This means that the regional variations as observed in the bivariate analysis reflected 
mainly the socio-economic and decision-making differences among respondents in 
those regions so that region ceases to be significant once these are controlled for at 
least for urban women in the sample.  For rural women, on the other hand, region 
remains significant in determining the desire for no more children after controlling 
for all other variables in the analysis. The results reveal that women living in rural 
Punjab show the greatest likelihood to want no more children, closely followed by 
women in the NWFP and Sindh, in comparison with those living in Balochistan. 
 
Current Contraceptive Use 
Taking current contraceptive use as another indicator of reproductive 
behaviour,  the  variable  is  defined  as 1 for those who reported using any method at 
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the time of survey and zero otherwise.  The logistic regression results are shown in 
Table 3 as a function of decision-making and background characteristics of urban 
and rural women separately.  The odds ratios above 1.0 indicate greater likelihood of 
using a contraceptive method for each unit increase in specific category of discrete 
variables in comparison with the omitted (reference) category and are presented in 
three models. 
The results in Table 3 indicate that the effects of decision-making and 
mobility variables on contraceptive use are strong and significant for urban women 
across all models, but give a somewhat mixed picture for rural women.  For urban 
women in model 3, where controls for socio-demographic factors and region of 
residence are included, all variables except those for paid employment and region, 
show a significant positive impact on contraceptive use. The odds ratios of using 
contraceptives are the highest for women with higher ages, high parity, primary as 
well as secondary and above schooling, and those reporting husband-wife 
communication.  However, the effects of wife’s decision-making on use also remain 
positive and significant.  For rural women, on the other hand, the findings indicate 
that except for participation in decisions with regard to household purchases and 
freedom to go outside home alone, all other variables are important in increasing the 
likelihood of the woman’s using a contraceptive method.  This means that most of 
the effect of decision-making and mobility factors for rural women is channelled 
through her demographic and educational background.  As Table 3 (model 3) shows, 
the odds ratios of rural women are the highest for primary as well as secondary and 
above levels of education, high parity, and communication with husbands about 
family planning.  
Also interesting to note is the finding that paid work tends slightly to lower 
women’s use of contraception in comparison with those not working.  It appears that 
paid employment for those few rural women does not empower them to make family 
planning choices, and these women may be especially conscious of accepting family 
planning as normative behaviour.  Moreover, women’s paid employment is most 
often based on need rather than choice, and as such may not be a motivating factor to 
adopt fertility control behaviour. 
Overall, these results suggest that much of the effect of decision-making 
variables on reproductive behaviour is captured by socio-demographic indicators; 
notable are age, parity, and level of education. Age and parity can always be 
expected to account for much of the variation in desired fertility and contraceptive 
use, but the fact that the inclusion of other socio-demographic indicators has 
weakened the strength of the decision-making and mobility variables supports the 
argument that a woman’s autonomy is substantially conditioned by her socio-
economic background and the type of setting in which she lives.  Hence, women’s 
decision-making involvement gives only a partial explanation of their demographic 
behaviour  once these background factors are controlled for. Despite this, however, it  
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Table 3  
Odds Ratios of Current Contraceptive Use as a Function of Decision-making and 
Socio-demographic Variables among Currently Married  
Urban and Rural Women, Pakistan, 1996-97 
Urban Women Rural Women 
Variables 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
A. Decision-making Variables       
Decision for Child Treatment       
Mother-in-law/Other (r) – – – – – – 
Wife 2.28*** 1.62*** 1.61*** 1.73*** 1.45** 1.39** 
Husband 2.24 1.77*** 1.78*** 1.53*** 1.35** 1.38** 
Decision HH Purchases       
Mother-in-law/Other (r) – – – – – – 
Wife 2.23*** 1.88*** 1.90*** 1.38 1.11 1.03 
Husband 1.64*** 1.39*** 1.60*** 0.99* 0.80* 0.83* 
Mobility       
No (r) – – – – – – 
Yes 1.37** 1.22* 1.24* 1.20* 1.03 1.04 
Can Go to Hospital Alone       
Accompanied/Depends (r) – – – – – – 
Alone 1.35** 1.23* 1.22* 1.73*** 1.48*** 1.39** 
Husband-Wife Communication       
No (r) – – – – – – 
Yes 3.24*** 3.64*** 3.58*** 5.67*** 5.23*** 5.35*** 
B. Socio-demographic Indicators       
Women’s Age       
15–24 (r) – – – – – – 
25–34  2.81*** 2.77***  1.56** 1.49** 
35+  4.01*** 3.94***  1.79*** 1.70*** 
Parity       
<4 Children (r) – – – – – – 
4 and More  2.61*** 2.63***  3.90*** 3.09*** 
Women’s Education       
None/Informal (r) – – – – – – 
Primary and Middle  2.51*** 2.49***  2.97*** 2.71*** 
Secondary and Above  2.35*** 2.38***  4.39*** 4.09*** 
Paid Work       
No (r) – – – – – – 
Yes  0.97 0.97  0.90** 0.79** 
Region       
Balochistan (r) – – – – – – 
NWFP   1.24   1.79** 
Punjab   1.43   3.36*** 
Sindh   1.27   3.18*** 
–2 log Likelihood  2365.3 2363.3 4403.7 4413.8 4067.4 
(N)  (2245)   (5340)  
Significant at *P≤ .05; **P≤ .01 and ***P≤ .001. 
(r) = reference category. 
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is worth noting that husband-wife communication is critical in determining 
reproductive behaviour of Pakistani women as its effects remain strong and positive 
across all models for both urban and rural samples of women. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the study provide important insights into the relationship 
between women’s decision-making power and reproductive behaviour in two distinct 
urban and rural settings of Pakistan. Although the relationship is complex and 
mediated by many socio-demographic and cultural factors, the analysis reveals broad 
patterns and variations in women’s domestic decision-making and the limited 
explanatory power it has in predicting demographic behaviour. 
The findings reveal that women’s decision-making authority is strongly 
related to the context in which they live, with urban women having an almost equal 
say as their husbands in domestic decisions, whereas rural women report that most 
household matters are predominantly decided by their husbands and other family 
members.  There is a clear regional diversity in women’s involvement in decision-
making, indicating to some extent the variability in power relations and gender 
inequality across regions, especially in rural areas.  The results also indicate that 
women who enjoy freedom to go either to a neighbouring village or to hospital/clinic 
alone are also more likely to participate in domestic decisions, and the linkage is 
stronger for the rural than urban women. This means that efforts to improve 
women’s status indicators in terms of mobility and access to health services and 
other resources can have important repercussions for enhancing women’s position in 
the household and thus influencing demographic outcome. 
The ways in which women’s decision-making position influences 
reproductive behaviour are rather more complex and give a somewhat mixed picture 
for urban and rural women. However, it appears that decision-making autonomy as 
such is not irrelevant or negative in shaping and influencing fertility intentions and 
contraceptive use.  Rather, it has an important independent effect and only a partial 
implication for women’s demographic behaviour.  However, the strong and positive 
relationship between husband-wife communication and contraceptive use or desire 
for future birth is evident for both urban and rural women across all models.  It can 
be inferred from this that policy-makers and programme managers should 
increasingly consider men’s involvement in family planning programme objectives, 
while focusing on women’s special needs and constraints in accessing the 
availability of services.  The results also suggest that the impact of decision-making 
autonomy on measures of reproductive behaviour is strongly conditioned by socio-
economic and demographic factors.  In this regard, the results confirm the 
importance of women’s education and lifecycle factors in determining reproductive 
behaviour, especially in case of rural women.  However, the case for the use of paid 
employment as a proxy of women’s position and decision-making authority, 
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especially in its relationship to fertility behaviour, is discredited by these results. The 
contrary effect to that expected of paid work on measures of decision-making and 
reproductive behaviour as well as the small number of women reported as engaged in 
paid employment raise some questions about exploring this relationship further. 
These results suggest that greater gender inequality and limited decision-
making power of women in a given social context clearly affect reproductive 
behaviour. The fact that decision-making measures of empowerment have a 
mitigated effect on women’s  decision-making (once the conditioning effect of socio-
economic and regional factors is taken into consideration) means that these measures 
of empowerment give only a partial explanation of women’s fertility-related 
behaviour.  This study, however, reinforces the point that while efforts at improving 
Pakistani women’s status in terms of their enhanced role in domestic decision-
making is not just an appropriate goal and a positive end in itself, but that the 
benefits extend to achieving gender equality and fertility reduction outcomes—goals 
that should be central to a population and development policy. 
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Appendices 
Appendix Table 1 
Percentage Distribution of Currently Married Urban and Rural Women, by        
Socio-economic and Demographic Characteristics, Pakistan, 1996-97 
Urban Women Rural Women  
Characteristics % Number % Number 
All Women 100.0 (2245) 100.0 (5340) 
Women Age 
   15–24 
   25–34 
   35+ 
 
19.2 
42.6 
38.2 
 
(431) 
(957) 
(857) 
 
26.7 
41.2 
32.0 
 
(1426) 
(2205) 
(1709) 
Marriage Duration 
   <10 Years 
   10-19 Years 
   20+ Years 
 
36.1 
36.8 
10.9 
 
(788) 
(802) 
(591) 
 
40.8 
38.7 
22.5 
 
(2118) 
(1907) 
(1167) 
Parity 
   Less than 4 Living Children 
   4 or More 
 
51.0 
49.0 
 
(1144) 
(1101) 
 
52.4 
47.6 
 
(2795) 
(2545) 
Women’s Education 
   None/Informal  
   Below Matric (1–9) 
   Matric and Above (10+) 
 
49.3 
23.8 
26.9 
 
(11.06) 
(535) 
(604) 
 
85.7 
11.5 
2.8 
 
(4578) 
(615) 
(147) 
Region 
   NWFP 
   Punjab 
   Sindh 
   Balochistan 
 
8.7 
52.4 
36.3 
2.6 
 
(195) 
(1176) 
(814) 
(59) 
 
17.0 
60.9 
16.2 
4.1 
 
(907) 
(3253) 
(866) 
(313) 
Paid Work 
   Yes 
   No 
 
14.5 
85.5 
 
(325) 
(1920) 
 
21.2 
78.8 
 
(1133) 
(4207) 
Employment Status 
   Not Working 
   Works for Someone Else 
   Self-employed 
 
85.5 
4.2 
10.2 
 
(1920) 
(95) 
(230) 
 
78.8 
3.8 
7.9 
 
(4207) 
(206) 
(926) 
Mobility 
   Gone Outside Home Alone 
   No 
 
24.4 
75.6 
 
(848) 
(1697) 
 
15.0 
85.0 
 
(803) 
(6234) 
Can Go to Hospital 
   Alone 
   Accompanied/Depends 
 
35.5 
64.5 
 
(796) 
(1149) 
 
19.1 
80.9 
 
(1019) 
(4320) 
Decision about Child Treatment 
   Wife 
   Husband 
   Jointly/Others 
 
39.4 
39.4 
21.3 
 
(791) 
(791) 
(428) 
 
23.1 
55.2 
21.7 
 
(1066) 
(2545) 
(998) 
Decision about HH Purchases 
   Wife 
   Husband 
   Others 
 
35.6 
36.8 
27.6 
 
(793) 
(826) 
(620) 
 
21.2 
50.4 
28.4 
 
(1134) 
(2689) 
(1516) 
Husband-Wife Communication 
   Never  
   Once or More 
 
48.7 
51.3 
 
(1042) 
(1152) 
 
57.8 
42.2 
 
(3087) 
(2252) 
Contraceptive Use 
   Yes 
   No 
 
36.5 
63.5 
 
(819) 
(1425) 
 
18.6 
81.4 
 
(994) 
(4345) 
Desire for Additional Children 
   No More Children 
   Want More Children 
 
49.5 
50.5 
 
(1111) 
(1134) 
 
39.2 
60.8 
 
(2094) 
(3245) 
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Appendix Table 2 
Percentage of Currently Married Urban and Rural Women 
Reporting Final Decision-making about Child Treatment, Pakistan: 1996-97 
Urban Women Rural Women 
Characteristics 
% Number χ2 
Values 
% Number χ2 
Values 
All Women 
Women Age 
  15–24 
  25–34 
  35+ 
39.3 
 
24.3 
38.6 
45.5 
(2011) 
 
(300) 
(876) 
(835) 
 
 
51.5 
P<.001 
23.1 
 
15.1 
23.5 
27.2 
(4609) 
 
(910) 
(2065) 
(1634) 
 
 
94.1 
P<.001 
 
Marriage Duration 
  <10 
  10–19 
  20+ 
 
32.3 
40.5 
46.0 
 
(657) 
(776) 
(576) 
 
38.3 
P<.001 
 
 
16.5 
26.3 
27.6 
 
(1640) 
(1829) 
(1139) 
 
 
136.2 
P<.001 
Parity 
  <4 
  4+ 
 
33.4 
44.2 
 
(910) 
(1101) 
 
38.8 
P<.001 
 
19.8 
25.8 
 
(2065) 
(2544) 
 
84.9 
P<.001 
Women Education 
  No Formal Education 
  Below Matric 
  Matric and Above 
 
36.0 
41.1 
44.3 
 
(1004) 
(470) 
(537) 
 
18.5 
P<.001 
 
22.0 
25.0 
51.2 
 
(3966) 
(516) 
(127) 
 
121.9 
P<.001 
Region 
  NWFP 
  Punjab 
  Sindh 
  Balochistan 
 
19.3 
40.2 
44.8 
18.9 
 
(176) 
(1073) 
(708) 
(54) 
 
 
60.1 
P<.001 
 
12.9 
30.7 
11.8 
4.2 
 
(790) 
(2819) 
(735) 
(264) 
 
 
279.0 
P<.001 
Paid Work 
  Yes 
  Not Working 
 
54.0 
36.9 
 
(291) 
(1720) 
 
35.2 
P<.001 
 
20.7 
23.8 
 
(987) 
(3621) 
 
4.9 
P<.10 
Employment Status 
  Works for Someone Else 
  Self-employed/Family 
  Not Working 
 
50.0 
55.5 
36.9 
 
(80) 
(211) 
(1720) 
 
35.9 
P<.001 
 
31.6 
18.1 
23.8 
 
(187) 
(800) 
(3623) 
 
210.6 
P<.001 
Mobility 
  Moved Alone 
  No 
 
55.4 
34.0 
 
(505) 
(1505) 
 
74.7 
P<.001 
 
38.7 
20.0 
 
(764) 
(3854) 
 
128.9 
P<.001 
Can Go to Hospital 
  Alone 
  Accompanied 
 
56.5 
29.3 
 
(744) 
(1266) 
 
144.5 
P<.001 
 
48.8 
16.3 
 
(971) 
(3638) 
 
457.7 
P<.001 
Husband-Wife  
 Communication 
  Never 
  Once or More 
 
 
37.4 
41.1 
 
 
(927) 
(1083) 
 
 
12.1 
P<.001 
 
 
21.1 
25.6 
 
 
(2517) 
(2092) 
 
 
13.5 
P<.001 
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Appendix Table 3  
Percentage of Currently Married Urban and Rural Women Reporting Final 
Decision-making about Household Purchases, Pakistan, 1996-97 
Urban Women Rural Women 
Characteristics 
% Number χ2 
Values 
% Number χ2 
Values 
All Women 
 
Women Age 
  15–24 
  25–34 
  35+ 
35.5 
 
 
18,3 
33.8 
46.2 
(2245) 
 
 
(431) 
(957) 
(857) 
 
 
 
164.8 
P<.001 
 
21.2 
 
 
10.0 
22.0 
29.0 
(5340) 
 
 
(1426) 
(2205) 
(1709) 
 
 
 
420.3 
P<.001 
Marriage Duration 
  <10 Years 
  10-19 Years 
  20+ Years 
 
23.6 
41.8 
45.0 
 
(788) 
(803) 
(591) 
 
 
142.4 
P<.001 
 
13.3 
25.1 
30.8 
 
(2118) 
(1907) 
(1167) 
 
593.5 
P<.001 
Parity 
  <4  Living Children 
  4+  Living Children 
 
30.9 
40.3 
 
(1144) 
(1101) 
 
80.9 
P<.001 
 
16.3 
26.7 
 
(2795) 
(2545) 
 
429.9 
P<.001 
Women Education 
  No Formal Education 
  Below Matric 
  Matric and Above 
 
30.7 
37.5 
42.9 
 
(1106) 
(539) 
(609) 
 
 
74.1 
P<.001 
 
20.6 
23.6 
30.8 
 
(4577) 
(615) 
(146) 
 
 
84.3 
P<.001 
Region 
  NWFP 
  Punjab 
  Sindh 
  Balochistan 
 
26.0 
34.5 
40.8 
16.7 
 
(196) 
(1176) 
(814) 
(60) 
 
 
46.0 
P<.001 
 
8.6 
29.6 
8.0 
7.7 
 
(807) 
(3253) 
(866) 
(314) 
 
 
415.3 
P<.001 
Paid Work 
  Yes 
  Not Working 
 
42.0 
34.5 
 
(324) 
(1921) 
 
10.9 
P<.001 
 
15.4 
22.9 
 
(1132) 
(4207) 
 
44.8 
P<.001 
Employment Status 
  Works for Someone Else 
  Self-employed/Family 
  Not Working 
 
45.3 
40.6 
34.5 
 
(95) 
(229) 
(1921) 
 
 
11.6 
P<.05 
 
19.0 
14.3 
22.9 
 
(205) 
(920) 
(4209) 
 
 
40.6 
P<.001 
Mobility 
  Gone Outside Home Alone 
  No 
 
48.4 
31.4 
 
(548) 
(1697) 
 
51.9 
P<.001 
 
39.2 
18.1 
 
(803) 
(4536) 
 
184.0 
P<.001 
Can Go to Hospital 
  Alone 
  Accompanied/Depends 
 
53.5 
25.7 
 
(795) 
(1449) 
 
173.0 
P<.001 
 
47.8 
15.0 
 
(1019) 
(4321) 
 
531.7 
P<.001 
Husband-Wife  
 Communication 
  Never 
  Once or More 
 
 
33.2 
37.8 
 
 
(1092) 
(1152) 
 
 
7.3 
P<.15 
 
 
19.0 
24.2 
 
 
(3088) 
(2252) 
 
 
38.6 
P<.001 
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